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Overcoming Fragility as an Impediment to
Development in the Democratic Republic of Congo
Abstract
This brief is intended for the purpose of providing an objective analysis of the fragile
state of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in order to critically and holistically break
down the limiting factors of conflict, resource exploitation and corruption as they each play a
role in hindering sustainable development. For the past decade-and-a-half, a multifaceted
struggle composed of numerous armed groups has plagued the region, each vying for control
over the nation’s plentiful natural resources. Given the combined presence of the United Nations
MONUSCO intervention, Congolese forces and over one-hundred different militia groups, a
complex power-struggle at the regional, national and local levels has emerged. Subsequently, the
DRC has been left vulnerable to various human security concerns, a weak national government
and institutional framework, an under-functioning economy and an inability to progress towards
sustainable, long-term development.
Institutional fragility at the national level due to systematic corruption, political
patronage, resource exploitation, and prolonged armed conflict has suppressed local actors from
actualizing their economic and development potential by creating physical, institutional,
infrastructural, and control barriers. As a result, the DRC merely maintains a facade of
democracy, sustained by actors whose goals have primarily been to mitigate the current conflict
and maintain militaristic control, rather than to implement key peacebuilding initiatives and
localized social and economic projects that would develop the country from the bottom-up and
carry it into the future as a key player and competitor on the regional and international fields.
Background
Comprising twenty-six vastly unique provinces, The Democratic Republic of Congo is a
relatively newly reestablished state that has seen complex, multifaceted levels of political and
social unrest on a scale far more significant than likely any other territory in its region. One of the
most interesting states within the African continent, the troublesome history of the DRC
foreshadows many of the obstacles that the country continues to face in the modern day.
Beginning at the 1884-85 Berlin Conference that divided the African continent among
multiple global superpowers, the DRC was claimed by Belgium as a private property of King
Leopold. Because the region was designated as private property rather than a colony, the king

retained complete authority over the people and resources within it. The center of economic
activity was in rubber exports, given the high international demand at the time, of which spurred
the emergence of child labor as a common practice to inexpensively source the material.
In 1908, the DRC was officially transferred to Belgium from King Leopold as a province,
which became known as the Belgian Congo. The years under Belgian colonial control are
characterized by a dramatic, monumental shift from the sourcing of rubber to cobalt and copper,
instead, of which remain among the country’s most sought-over resources to this day. There was
also a notable economic-based shift from the Western to the Eastern part of the country, where
mining was prevalent. This shift sparked a longstanding power-struggle in the Eastern DRC that
has only worsened over time; fueled by greed, as well as both human and resource exploitation.
After the DRC (then, known as the Republic of Congo) gained independence from
Belgium in 1960, political turmoil escalated into a military coup in 1965; Col. Joseph Mobutu
seized power as president and subsequently changed the country’s name from the Republic of the
Congo to Zaire. For the following thirty-two years, Mobutu retained his power through a
combination of sham elections and sheer violence (CIA 2019), fostering intense anger and distrust
among the many clashing cultural groups in the region, both between each other and towards the
national government. After years of internal ethnic and political conflict, Mobutu’s regime finally
collapsed during a Rwandan/Ugandan-backed rebellion in 1997 (notably comprised of refugees
who survived the 1994 Rwandan genocide) led by Laurent Kabila, who again re-named the
country to the Democratic Republic of the Congo after claiming the presidency. Peace was unsustained once again, as a massive-scale civil war erupted in 1998; parties included roughly nine
nearby African countries and various local armed groups. The war formally ended in 2006 with
the signing of the multilateral Sun City Agreement and Pretoria Accord, which removed Rwandan
forces, reintegrated all armed groups into society, and established a national government.
Moreover, many argue that the war has never truly ended given the everlasting conflict, which is
believed to have killed up to six million Congolese people ever since.
Shortly after in 2006, the first elections, as well as the first Presidential, National
Assembly, and provincial legislatures took hold (CIA 2019), with Joseph Kaliba officially
solidifying his role as president of the DRC. In 2011, he was narrowly reelected for a second
term; however, the delaying of the most recent 2016 election to late December of 2018 (citing the
Ebola epidemic) once again heightened tensions between the public and national government, as
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Kaliba had extended his stay in office for half of a third term; this is prohibited by the two-term
limit stated in the DRC’s Constitution. Though the 2018 elections brought longtime politician
Félix Tshisekedi of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress Party to the presidency,
Tshisekedi only narrowly retained a plurality win with 38.6% of the popular vote. As a result,
political tensions, distrust, and overall state-fragility remain high; the economy is militarized
under the control of few generals (who retain governmental control under Tshisekedi’s nose) who
have personal strategic interests to deploy troops in the mining regions and resources remain
under the control of numerous armed groups and foreign actors, rather than the Congolese people.
The DRC’s complex historical background, formal peace accords, and subsequent
government implementation each run a theme of a lack of true legitimacy due to an absence of
coordination and the presence of far too many actors who vie for control. The Congolese people
nor elected officials of the DRC have never experienced genuine autonomy due to conflict driven
by heavy resource exploitation and extreme, deeply rooted corruption within the government.
None of the formal accords have sufficed due to a failing to address the roots of the issues; the
emphasis has instead been placed on promoting a facade of democracy and liberal institutions
(that satisfies the West) rather than concrete plans for investment in education, health, and
infrastructure at the local level in order to boost the economy and promote sustainable
development. As a result, the DRC hasn’t experienced any sort of long-term development, despite
its plentiful natural resources and ideal geographical positioning among key trade routes.
Thematic Rationale
The rationale behind this analysis emphasizes themes of global status and the global
agenda, as well as national and regional stability. While the DRC remains widely recognized, it
holds a reputation as an underdeveloped, corrupt, and unstable state. By addressing the root of
what is preventing the DRC from sustainable development, fragility, caused by conflict, resource
exploitation, and corruption, the nation will have the chance to actualize its developmental
potential for long-run success on on the international stage.
Moreover, development of the DRC through mitigating conflict, corruption and resource
exploitation in order to provide stability will provide a sense of legitimacy throughout the
African Continent, particularly for partnership with the African Union. Overall regional stability
is key for Sub-Saharan Africa’s development and competitiveness as a global partner for growth
and investment; as an equal player rather than a supplier. If we take a look to the SDGs,
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development through my recommendations will encompass the “No Poverty,” “Industry,
Innovation and Infrastructure,” “Decent Work and Economic Growth,” “Good Health and Wellbeing,” and “Quality Education” goals set forth by the UN in 2015. Enhancing the DRC with
these goals in mind will not only enhance the global agenda, but also enhance the country’s
global and regional status through its commitment to its people and the greater well-being of the
world in terms of collective security. Human security is not a state-specific problem; it presents
spillover effects, just as development does as well. If the DRC is to develop and promote human
security, a change is likely to be spurred in Rwanda, Uganda and the Central African Republic,
given their close ties in the region.
Theoretical framework
A victim of interdependency, the DRC has remained stagnant as both dependent upon
and as an exploited supplier to numerous outside actors and their host nations, who each vie for
control over the nation’s natural resources. The theory of interdependency within the context of
the developing world highlights interconnected nature between states and non-state actors within
the global system, as evolving with globalization. The global system relies on the DRC for
inexpensive sourcing of metals/materials, yet the DRC remains far more dependent on the global
system for underpaid revenue. Further, the DRC is the ultimate example of the “resource curse”
in the sense that many actors feel entitled to the resources available and are willing to do
anything in order to assert control, degrading the country’s environment/biodiversity, economy,
and human security in the process. In theory, if the UN framework and the FARDC were to unite
under a common agenda to take back control of the mines, the Congolese would be given space
to operate the production and distribution of their own natural resources and to participate in the
international market, thereby enhancing human capabilities through job access as an approach
for economic development. If not, these issues will continue to hinder development for years to
come if new solutions are not developed from a bottom-up perspective.

Main Points
Encompassed within the overarching theme of development, I assert that state fragility at
the hands of multifaceted conflict, resource exploitation and corruption is what has prevented
long term development within the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The longstanding conflict
in the country has prevailed long since the formal end of the civil war, leaving villages of
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innocent people to fear for their lives and for the loss of their livelihoods. Moreover, a society
simply has no room for development if constant armed conflict and violence undermines local
livelihoods and basic human security.
The conflict within the DRC lends way to my next point, that resource exploitation is
behind the state fragility and lack of development. There are over 100 known militia groups that
operate within the DRC that are backed behind numerous states. Of the various armed groups
who vying for control over the natural resources within the DRC (namely cobalt, copper,
diamonds and gold), the three largest are the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Democratic
Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), and the Mai Mai militia groups. The ADF (based
in Uganda) is believed to be the largest of the three and is even regarded as a terrorist
organization by the neighboring Ugandan Government. Regardless, these three groups have been
responsible for creating a warzone out of the DRC; millions of civilians have been killed and
many more have been permanently internally and externally displaced (BBC 2013), all in the
name of control over the mines.
Aside from conflict, the issue of resource exploitation creates economic implications as
well. For example, many Chinese distributors serve as the middleman between sourcing cobalt at
the mines and selling it to American companies who use it in batteries to power cell phones,
computers, and automobiles (i.e. Apple, Tesla, Microsoft, etc.). Many other actors from different
nations play the same sort of role, harvesting cobalt for use in ways that does not at all directly
profit the DRC, therefore undermining its economy through the restriction of its profit margin.
These practices lower the human capabilities of the Congolese in terms of development
because they are pushed out of the industry at higher levels past the sourcing of the minerals
themselves. Child labor is still heavily relied upon at the mines, where up to 35,000 children
work in mining, which depletes the long-term workforce because children are kept out of school
and do not learn skills needed for the workforce down the road. This leaves more room for
outside actors to take control, thus promoting the cycle of interdependency.
Finally, I purport that corruption at the national level has weakened the government and
the institutions set forth during the drafting of the most recent constitution in 2006. While the
most recent 2018 election presented a promising outcome by finally electing a president who has
never previously served in the FARDC, the national government itself remains executed by
military generals and ex-soldiers from the corrupt FARDC. These individuals who enter politics
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generally only have military goals in mind and do little to ensure any civil, economic or health
benefits for the Congolese people. For example, in July of 2018, then president, Joseph Kabila,
appointed two sanctioned generals to key army posts, despite their charges for known human
rights violations (Ssuuna 2018). Decisions are made on the basis of retaining power and
influence. Himself an ex-military general, this incident took place when Kablia was in the midst
of overstaying his term in office, which was set to end in 2016. The majority of these leaders aim
to retain power and influence for personal benefit while fronting a democratic exterior to hush
outside condemnation. Development is simply not a priority for the national government, and
never will be if corrupt, greedy actors continue to have a place in it.
Challenges
In addition to my main points, additional challenges remain in the way of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo by suppressing development and further contributing to the corruption,
conflict, and resource exploitation that exist. First and foremost, the FARDC; the national
military organization responsible for defending the DRC, of which was rebuilt after the Second
Congo War as part of the formal peace process. As stated in the 2002 Pretoria Agreement, all
hostile groups were required to incorporate themselves into an integrated national army; among
these groups included the DRC soldiers, members of the RCD, the MLC, and the Mai-Mai
(Pretoria Agreement 2002). The forced integration of these previously warring parties did not
provide a smooth transition, as many still retain their previous groups’ ideologies and goals, of
which operate within hidden chains of command in the FARDC. As a result, the force remains
weak, divided, poorly trained, and without direction; thus, ineffective. This presents challenges
in the face of development given their inability to work cohesively and effectively with the UN
mission. If the FARDC cannot mobilize as a singular force in order to take back control of the
country from armed rebel groups and ensure human security, development is not a viable option.
Another prevalent challenge emerges from the United Nations MONUSCO mission
itself. Aside from its ineffectiveness in light of the continued conflict, there are numerous
problems within the body that exacerbate the conflict at hand. What began as a mandate to
“facilitate peaceful political negotiations between belligerents,” (Yenda Ilunga 2019), has since
evolved into an offensive peacekeeping mission with a focus on protecting civilians and building
institutions. The mission has taken a far more invasive approach than it was originally intended
to, which has caused further hostilities in the region from both rebel groups and in the eyes of the
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FARDC/national government. Moreover, MONUSCO peacekeepers are trained to operate within
a formal war, where sides are clear, and hostilities solely take place between combatants.
However, the conflict in the DRC is entirely asymmetric, including belligerents from multiple
sides even within a singular force, as characterized by the FARDC. The UN’s incoordination and
lack of a tailored strategy has left civilians in harm's way and further fueled the existing conflict
by presenting yet another actor, rather than any sort of concrete relief.
Recommendations
In order to build off of existing development momentum, key infrastructural and
institutional changes that are directly tailored to the needs of local populations are required in the
DRC. There must be a strengthening of national policies, more space given for civil society to
operate, and intense institutional reform at both the local level in order for sustainable,
autonomous development to take place in the long run. To achieve this, my recommendations to
combat the most immediate major challenges are fourfold:
1. Unify the FARDC from the bottom-up.
a. Follow President Tshisekedi’s approach for strengthening military and bring
effectiveness by ending the war mentality, weeding out corrupt actors, and
changing the overall culture within the army. Emphasize unification under a
common goal. Direct Tshisekedi to appoint honest military leaders and try/convict
individuals guilty of war crimes and/or treason.
b. End the history of no compensation; the national government must start paying
soldiers so that they are incentivized to defend the DRC and not fall to corrupt
ideologies and hidden agendas.
c. Prioritize coordination between the MONUSCO and the FARDC to unite under
common agenda for the FARDC to regain control of the region and suppress the
militias and rebel groups.
d. Institute a plan to properly train the FARDC as an effective unit. Maintain UN
military assistance until the FARDC is ready, then promptly remove in phases.
2. Maintain an authoritarian government that is committed to development and the
improvement of the lives of the Congolese or continue with the current democratic
system but with a strict function of accountability for elected officials.
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a. Current system is nothing more than a facade of democracy; autocracy might be
necessary in order to reduce corruption due to conflicting goals of various actors.
b. Solely appoint Congolese leaders to government positions, who have the best
interest of the Congolese people; a Ghaddafi 2.0 would be ideal.
c. Align the national government with the AU and UN (but retain the sole power)
for the sake of regional stability and oversight for long-term projects.
d. Give a voice to minority groups; Address ethnic divisions and aim to house all
groups peacefully (peace and human security creates sustainable development)
e. Enforce punishment for belligerent leaders and corrupt actors within the current
system in order to set a harsh precedent.
3. The national government must take back control of the mines for the sake of economic
expansion and reducing conflict, as well as incentivize the local population to run them.
a. Remove the middleman in cobalt distribution; create a system in which buyers
must buy directly from the source to generate maximum profits for the DRC.
b. Impose child labor restrictions at the national and local levels in order to allow for
an educated workforce to grow for the long-term.
4. Infrastructural reform with an emphasis on bottom-up approach to development that
stress enhancing the health and human capabilities of local actors for sustainability (i.e.
redirecting the bulk of the responsibility for development to the Congolese).
a. Support localized educational efforts through NGOs and national funding.
b. Encourage micro-financing for small businesses and entrepreneurs at the local
level, particularly for female owned businesses, in order to empower the
population and to spur local economic growth aside from mining.
c. Implement a comprehensive set of health initiatives with a focus on strengthening
the direct supply chain of medicines and supplies to Congolese medical facilities.
i.

Improve and build additional roadways near new and existing clinics, thus
reducing immediate physical barriers to access.

ii.

Direct donor funding towards establishing additional clinics and hospitals,
as well as towards supplying them (rather than supplying aid directly to
the Congolese citizens).
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iii.

Fund a cold-chain vaccine storage-hub in the capital city of Kinshasa,
utilizing Solar Direct Drive refrigerators, powered by renewable solar
energy (Gavi 2019), for storage of oral-cholera and malaria vaccines.

iv.

Improve access to the electrical grid starting with the Equateur and
Tshuapa Northwestern provinces, which serve as existing NGCA Initiative
sites that are currently experimenting with healthcare supply chain
revision projects (VillageReach 2015).

Conclusion
On the surface, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a state riddled with conflict,
corruption, and resource exploitation to a degree that has severely restricted its development
prospects for decades. What is left is a state that has become imprisoned by its own fragility,
controlled by actors who have no business in the country. The inability of the DRC to fully stand
on its own has kept it from emerging as the dominant economic power that it has the potential to
be within the African continent, given its vast natural resources. However, with the right set of
institutional and infrastructural changes, combined with a comprehensive approach towards
development that focuses on bottom-up and enhancing human capabilities, the DRC may finally
see the evolution that it is long overdue for.
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